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REFLECTIONS OF THE WORLD
BANK'S REPORT ON THE
TREATMENT OF THE
INSOLVENCY OF NATURAL

PERSONS IN THE NEWEST
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY
LAWS: COLOMBIA, ITALY,
IRELAND
Jason J. Kilborn*
I. INTRODUCTION

In 2011, the World Bank initiated its first-ever examination of the policies and characteristics of effective insolvency
systems for individuals (natural persons). This paper describes
the two-year process that led to the publication of the World
Bank's landmark Report on the Treatment of the Insolvency of
Natural Persons.1 After examining the key content and three
major themes of the Report, three of the most recent new personal insolvency regimes are introduced with an eye to identifying the ways in which the themes of the Report are reflected
in these new laws. The personal insolvency provisions in Co* John Marshall Law School (Chicago), jkilborn@jmls.edu. Though I
served as the volunteer chairperson of the committee responsible for drafting
the World Bank report described here, all comments on the report and its potential interpretation are my own and do not necessarily reflect the position
of any other member of the drafting committee, the Working Group, the Task
Force, or the World Bank. I am deeply grateful for the World Bank's invitation for me to lead this monumental project. All translations of non-English
materials are mine, and most of the materials cited here for the Colombian
and Italian developments are unfortunately not available in English.
1 World Bank, Report on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons (2013) [hereinafter, WB Report].

2015]

REFLECTIONS OF THE WORLD BANK'S REPORT

307

lombian law most directly evidence the influence of the World
Bank project. Its major themes are reflected distinctly in the
new laws in Italy and Ireland, as well, though in very different
ways, lending support to the World Bank's predictions of convergence but continuing diversity of approach around the world
in this rapidly developing area of law.

II. GENESIS,

CREATION AND CONTENT OF THE WORLD
BANK'S REPORT

In reaction to a financial crisis in emerging markets in
1997-1998, the World Bank formalized and systematized its
practice of offering guidance to policymakers in the developing
world on how to structure effective business bankruptcy and
restructuring systems. 2 While the content and methodology of
this formal guidance evolved over the first decade of the 21st
century, 3 neither the World Bank nor the International Monetary Fund addressed the parallel challenge of regulating the
growing problem of personal insolvency and individual over4
indebtedness.
When another global financial crisis in 2007-2008 struck
the household sector head-on and triggered a worldwide recession, observers inside the Bank recognized that the building
macro-economic pressure of personal insolvency posed a systemic risk to economic development and international financial
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available at http://go.worldbank.org/LYCZB7H890;
World Bank, Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor
Rights Systems 2 (2001) availableat http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/
default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2009/04/20/000333038 2009
0420014706/Rendered/PDF/481650WP0200111OBox338887BO1PUBLIC 1.pdf.
3 World Bank, Principles for Effective Creditor Rights and Insolvency
Systems, supra note 2 (charting the development of the Principles from 2001
to their most recent amendment in 2011); see also World Bank, Creditor
Rights and Insolvency ROSC Assessment Methodology (December 2005 Revised Draft), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/GILD/Resources/
ROSC Methodology ICR FINAL (March 09).pdf.
4 See, e.g., Yan Liu & Christoph B. Rosenberg, International Monetary
Fund, Dealing with Private Debt Distress in the Wake of the European Financial Crisis: A Review of the Economics and Legal Toolbox, IMF Working
Paper 13/44 (2013), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1344.pdf
(noting that, despite an urgent need, "there is no established international
best practice at all in this area [of household debt restructuring]").
INSOLVENCY
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stability. 5 The World Bank's Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor
Regimes Task Force (the "Task Force") had been instrumental
in developing strategies for evaluating business insolvency systems and practices.6 Therefore, the Bank turned to this Task
Force again at its January 2011 meeting to explore the possibility of producing guidance for treating the expanding epidemic
of personal insolvency.
A. Convening the Committee and Creating the Report
The Task Force "generally acknowledged the necessity and
importance for international organizations to develop guidance
with regard to consumer insolvency law and policy," as well as
the "need for the modernization of domestic laws and institutions to enable jurisdictions to deal effectively and efficiently
with the risks of individual over indebtedness." 7 Consequently,
the World Bank and the Task Force created a special Working
Group on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons
(the "Working Group") to examine the most salient issues, policies, and practices implicated distinctly in the context of personal insolvency, as opposed to the liquidation or restructuring
of business entities. 8 The Working Group's specific assignment
was "to study the issue of natural person insolvency and produce a reflective document on this matter, suggesting guidance
for the treatment of the different issues involved, and taking
into account different policy options and the diverse sensitivities around the world." 9
For the hands-on task of drafting this reflective document,
the Working Group reached out to several academics who had
concentrated for years on a comparative analysis of the policies
and developing practices of treating personal insolvency.10
5 Susan Block-Lieb, The World Bank, Best Practices in the Insolvency of
Natural Persons:
Rapporteur's Synopsis
1, 17 (2011), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGILD/Resources/
WB TF 2011 Consumer-Insolvency.pdf; WB Report, supra note 1, 3.
6 For a description of this Task Force, see WB Report, supra note 1,
2
(describing the Task Force as "[biringing together experienced judges, expert
practitioners, academics and policymakers from around the world").
7 Block-Lieb, supra note 5,
14, 17.
8
Id. 17; WB Report, supra note 1,
5-7.
9 WB Report, supra note 1, 7.
10Jos6 Garrido, Senior Counsel in the World Bank's Legal Vice Presiden-
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Their collective knowledge and perspectives would provide the
baseline for drafting a report to be discussed, debated, and
adopted over the next two years by the Working Group and the
larger Task Force. The drafting committee produced a first
draft for discussion at the Working Group's first meeting at the
World Bank in Washington, D.C., in November 2011.11 In response to numerous comments and questions, the committee
revised the report over the course of the following year and
presented a second draft at the Working Group's second and final meeting in December 2012.12 Both the Working Group and
the Task Force approved the final Report on the Treatment of
the Insolvency of Natural Persons, which was subsequently
published on the World Bank's website, within the Global In13
solvency Law Database.
B. Overview of the Report and Its Three Main Themes
As the Working Group's assignment 14 and the name of the
document reflect, the Report is a "reflective document"; that is,
it does not offer prescriptions or even recommendations. 15 Its
purpose is to inform policymakers, first as to the need for and
many advantages offered by a system for treating personal insolvency; 16 and second as to the characteristics of existing syscy, recruited and actively participated in the drafting committee, providing
both vital coordination and extremely insightful comments on the report
throughout the drafting process. The drafting committee was chaired by Jason Kilborn, of John Marshall Law School (Chicago, USA), joined by Charlie
Booth, of the University of Hawai'i School of Law (USA), Johanna Niemi, of
the University of Helsinki Faculty of Law (Finland), and lain Ramsay, of
Kent Law School at the University of Kent (England).
11WB REPORT, supra note 1, 8; see also Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor
Regimes Task Force Meeting (2011), available at http://go.worldbank.org/
X9MIOVN9Y0.
12 WB REPORT, supra note 1,
8; see also Working Group for the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons, WORLD BANK INSOLVENCY LAW
DATABASE, (Last updated June 5, 2013), available at http://go.worldbank.org/
6NEL6EOA10.
13 See Statement on the Report on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons (Dec. 14, 2012), http://go.worldbank.org/F28SN44XE0.
14 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
15 WB REPORT, supra note 1,
55.
16 I will use the terms "insolvency" and "over indebtedness" interchangeably, and I will refer to "personal," "individual," and perhaps "consumer" as
interchangeable adjectives to describe the subject of the problem to be treat-
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tems that have proven most effective and most problematic.17
An extended introductory section lays an important foundation
in winning hearts and minds, implicitly but unmistakably suggesting that more countries should give serious consideration
18
to adopting a system for treating personal over indebtedness.
After cataloguing the proper orientation of a personal insolvency system within the context of similar legal structures for
combatting, for example, poverty and business insolvency, 19 the
Report lays out a wide variety of advantages-for creditors,
debtors, and society-identified by lawmakers as the reasons
for their having adopted personal insolvency regimes. 20 The introductory section concludes with a discussion of several factors
that have hindered the adoption or implementation of effective
means for addressing personal insolvency. It suggests that
fears of moral hazard and fraud by debtors have scant empirical foundation and can be overcome with proper administrative
procedures, while struggling with social stigma and reluctance
by debtors to seek relief remains the more significant chal21
lenge.
As to the optimal way to structure a legal system for treating personal insolvency, the Working Group concluded that no
one set of approaches could be identified as the "best" practices
in this area, and attempting to impose one standard on widely
varying cultures and socio-economic contexts would be unconstructive. 22 Nonetheless, the language of the Report clearly indicates that some approaches are preferable to others that have
caused substantial problems and rendered existing systems
23
less efficient and less effective.
Indeed, the Report references several "precedents" that

ed. As to the complications with language, especially the key question of how
to refer to the people being treated, the condition being treated, and the system for treating it, see WB Report, supra note 1,
17-18.
17 WB REPORT, supra note 1,
10, 55, 391-92.
18 A preliminary World Bank survey had revealed that "in more than half
of the middle and low income countries surveyed there is no system [addressing consumer insolvency] at all." BLOCK-LIEB, supra note 5, 1.
19 WB REPORT, supra note 1,
17-18, 25-52.
20
Id. 56-111.
21
id.
112-25.
22 Id.
12, 53-55.
23 WB REPORT, supra note 1, 7 131-34, 266-67, 277, 279, 285-89, 311-13.
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served as source material for its preparation, 24 some of which
make explicit recommendations as to at least better, if not best,
practices. For example, both the first and second edition of
INSOL International's Consumer Debt Report25 contain numerous, specific recommendations. Also, the Council of Europe's
26
Report on Legal Solutions to Debt Problems In Credit Societies
makes several broad but clear recommendations, which were
ultimately adopted formally as human rights norms by the
Council of Europe. 27 These and other recommendations from
international organizations are reflected in the World Bank's
Report, and they all form a consistent baseline of at least min28
imal best practice in personal insolvency treatment.
Although the Report eschews recommendations as to optimal detail, 29 three major themes stand out from both the Report and the recommendations from international organizations that preceded it. These three themes are useful, highlevel guidelines by which to evaluate existing and new personal
24

19-21.
INSOL INTERNATIONAL, CONSUMER DEBT REPORT: REPORT OF FINDINGS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 11-31 (2001), http://www.insol.org/pdf/consdebt.pdf;
INSOL INTERNATIONAL, CONSUMER DEBT REPORT II: REPORT OF
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13-24 (2011).
26 Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen & Ann-Sofie Henrikson, Bureau of the European Committee on Legal Co-Operation Report on Legal Solutions to Debt
ProblemsIn Credit Societies (2005).
27 A working group formulated a series of final recommendations and an
explanatory memorandum in February 2007. Final Activity Report of the
Group of Specialist for Legal Solutions to Debt Problems (CJ-S-DEBT)(2007).
These recommendations were adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe in June 2007. Legal solutions to debt problems: Recommendation Rec(2007)8 and explanatory memorandum, available at
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id= 1155927&Site=CM&BackColorlnternet=9
999CC&BackColorlntranet=FFBB5 5&BackColorLogged=FFAC 75#.
28 For a survey and analysis of several prominent recommendations from
1d.

25

international organizations, see

JASON J. KILBORN, EXPERT RECOMMENDATIONS
AND THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN BEST PRACTICES FOR THE TREATMENT OF
OVERINDEBTEDNESS, 1984-2010 (2011).
29 The Report discusses several topics under the heading "Core Legal Attributes of an Insolvency Regime for Natural Persons," including, in addition
to the major themes discussed below, (i) institutional framework (placement
within the corpus of the law, the roles of advisers, counselors, and courts versus administrative agencies, financing issues), (ii) access and restrictions on
access, (iii) limited creditor participation, (iv) liquidation of estate property
and exemptions from liquidation, (v) plan supervision and modification, and
(vi) special consideration of the payment of mortgages and other secured
loans. WB Report, supra note 1,
139-261, 302-09, 319-53.
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insolvency systems, as this paper will do in the following Part.
First, as mentioned above, 30 the most powerful overarching
theme of the Report is that countries who have not already
done so should implement a formal legal mechanism by which
over indebted persons can seek relief in the form of a forced
discharge of some or all31 of their debts. 32 This has been a unifying and consistent theme of previous recommendations from
33
international organizations spanning the past twenty years.
The Task Force's public statement announcing the completion
of this project stresses that "[a]n effective regime for the insolvency of natural persons is of crucial importance for economic
development and financial inclusion." 34As the World Bank's
preliminary survey reveals, however, many high-, middle-, and
low-income countries continue to resist the notion of freeing individuals from their legitimate contractual and delictual obligations. 35 Perhaps this will begin to change as the World Bank
adds its voice and gravitas to the chorus of those calling for
personal insolvency relief.
Second, the Report echoes another earlier theme relating
to negotiated workouts, though in decidedly less sanguine
terms. For a variety of reasons, most importantly avoiding the
costs and other burdens of formal intervention, the Report
notes a widespread policy preference for debtors not to use the
formal relief system. 36 Instead, debtors are encouraged to seek
informal- or at least out-of-court-negotiated solutions to
their financial distress. This was another prominent theme of
earlier international recommendations, almost as unifying as
30 See WB REPORT, supra notes 1
supra note 5 and accompanying text.

17-18, 25-52, 56-111; BLOCK-LIEB,

31 The Report is more explicit in its preference for a broad discharge, not
riddled with exceptions and exclusions. WB REPORT, supra note 1, 367 ("[Ilit
is important that as many of the debtor's debts as possible be included in the
scope of the discharge.").
32 Id.
354, 444 (observing that an essential element of economic rehabilitation, and a precondition for the many benefits outlined in the introductory section, is that "the debtor has to be freed from excessive debt").
33 See KILBORN, supra note 28, at 18.
34 Statement on the Report on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural
Persons, THE WORLD BANK, INSOLVENCY LAW DATABASE, (Dec. 14, 2012),
available at http://go.worldbank.org/F28SN44XEO.
35 See BLOCK-LIEB, supra note 18.
36 WB REPORT, supra note 1, 77 128-30.
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37
the desire for a compulsory discharge.
The World Bank's Report distinguishes itself from earlier
commentary on the preference for voluntary solutions, however, by emphasizing the practical challenges to achieving this
theoretically attractive goal. Noting that "the merits of voluntary settlements are often illusory," the Report cites the dangers of long delays and debtors being pressured to agree to "onerous payment plans that are not viable" and reveals that, for a
variety of powerful reasons, only a small portion of cases have
concluded with voluntary settlements even where institutional
support for such negotiations was present. 38 In fact, the Report
notes one country's abandonment of an earlier requirement
that debtors seek voluntary workouts as a prerequisite to entry
into the formal relief system due to the inevitable failure of
such negotiations.
If out-of-court, negotiated settlements are to have any
chance of success, the Report points out that, "some institutional support and incentives are needed," including free or
low-cost assistance from professional advisors with experience
negotiating with creditors. 39 The most substantial successes
have emerged when a government regulator has played a more
direct guiding role, such as by adopting codes of conduct for
40
creditor behavior in such negotiations.
The third and final most salient theme relates to the conditions for relief, the quid pro quo to be expected of debtors in exchange for the extraordinary relief of discharge of legitimate
debt. A general desire for a careful balance between debtor and
creditor interests came through powerfully in the Working
Group's discussions and is reflected in the Report.4 1 A crucial
aspect of that balance is an almost universal demand in existing systems that debtors earn their fresh start by subjecting
themselves to a rehabilitation plan and endeavoring to make
some level of installment payments to creditors. 42 The core of
this third theme is that these rehabilitation plans should be

37 See KILBORN, supra note 28, at 23-24.

WB REPORT, supra note 1,
131, 133-34, 404.
135, 137.
40
Id. 136.
41 See, e.g., id.
57, 115, 270, 283.
42
Id.55 262, 356.
38
3

9 Id.
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formulated with care, sensitive to the capacity of debtors to
bear whatever burdens are imposed on them. 43 This key aspect
of insolvency administration has been the focus of other international recommendations, as well, with a consistent emphasis
on moderating burdens and respecting debtors' human dignity.44 Expectations that these payment plans will produce sub45
stantial returns for creditors are destined for disappointment.
The Report catalogues potential challenges in terms of
both plan duration and the amount of payment debtors are
called on to make to creditors over the life of the plan. 46 It cautions that there seems to be an "inverse relationship between
plan length and plan success"; 47 that is, longer plans fail, and
the goals of an insolvency treatment system will be undermined if fewer debtors enter or are successful due to extended
payment plans. 48 Likewise with respect to payment expectations, the Report is critical of any requirement of a minimum
required payment or percentage dividend to creditors, which
"invariably
produces
undesirable
results,"
depriving
"[s]ignificant numbers of 'honest but unfortunate' debtors" of
needed relief.49 The most effective approach to determining
payment demands "is less a matter of defining a predetermined
benefit for creditors than of defining a predetermined level of
sacrifice for debtors." 50 This sacrifice is most effectively based
on a legislative determination of reasonable subsistence budgets sufficient to sustain a modest but dignified lifestyle for various types of debtors and families, with "surplus" income dedi51
cated to creditors.
The Report is roundly critical of relying on judicial or administrative discretion in determining either the length or the
payment demands of such rehabilitation plans. 52 "The appro43 Id.
358 ("A realistic view of debtors' situations, however, often leads
to prioritizing more lenient and shorter payment plans.
44 See KILBORN, supra note 28, at 53.
45 WB REPORT, supra note 1,
264-65, 298-300, 312.
46
Id.
262-301.
47 Id. 270.
48
Id. 265.
49
Id. 357.
50
Id. 274.
51 Id.
52 Id. 77 267, 285-89.
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priate measure of sacrifice to be demanded of debtors in exchange for whatever relief an insolvency system offers is a crucial and inherently political decision," the Report asserts, concluding that "[s]uch a central issue of public policy is likely
better made by a legislature or other representative entity, ra53
ther than by the administrators of the insolvency system."
III. REFLECTIONS IN THE NEWEST PERSONAL INSOLVENCY
LAWS: COLOMBIA, ITALY, IRELAND

The Report is based on observations of developments in
systems in place before 2012. It was drafted in the hope that it
might provide some useful guidance to policymakers in the process of developing new laws for treating personal over indebtedness. 5 4 This Part looks at three of the newest personal insolvency regimes to identify the degree to which the main themes
of the Report are reflected in the general approaches and specific provisions of these new laws.
To the extent that the record reflects this, it also searches
for evidence that the Report had any direct impact on policymakers' decision-making processes. Examination of the legislative process in Colombia, Italy, and Ireland reveals that the
World Bank project had a direct impact in at least one of these
countries, and the results in all three nations reflect-to varying degrees and in quite different ways-a desire to conform to
the Report's three main themes.
A. Colombia
The most powerful example of the influence of the Report
is presented in the case of Colombia. Not only are the themes
of the Report reflected in Colombia's new personal insolvency

law, but the content of that law changed dramatically as a direct result of the World Bank project.
Colombian policymakers had for some time been concerned
about protecting over indebted individuals, especially those not
engaged in commercial activity. A formal bankruptcy system
for businesses and individual merchants had been in place in
53

54

Id. 290.
Id.
7, 10, 22, 55.
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one form or another in Columbia for over a century. 55 But never had the law addressed the specific concerns of over indebted
56
individuals not engaged in commerce.
The lack of attention to consumer debtors became the subject of serious concern in 2007 when the Constitutional Court
was reviewing the latest in a series of insolvency laws, which
explicitly excluded individual debtors not engaged in commerce. 57 In its order, the Court exhorted the Colombian Congress to implement a regime specifically aimed at addressing
the insolvency of non-merchant individuals. 58 On 31 July 2008,
several members of the House of Representatives (Cdmara de
Representantes) introduced a bill to respond to the Constitutional Court's call to action. 59 The motivation behind the law
was expressed not in humanitarian terms, but in a desire to
enhance productivity and protect the availability of consumer
credit by allowing over indebted, non-merchant individuals to
rehabilitate their finances and "be reintegrated rapidly into the
financial system."6 0
The 2008 bill did not, however, propose an insolvency regime along the lines ultimately envisioned in the World Bank
Report. It did not provide for a mandatory discharge of debts
that the consumer debtor was unable to pay. Instead, this new
system was introduced and structured simply as "a procedure
for negotiation of debts."6 1 Though novel in its focus, this legislative initiative did little more than provide a brief stay of debt
enforcement procedures and explicitly assign the task of debt
settlement negotiation to the existing network of Conciliation
55 Ponencia para Primer Debate al Proyecto de Ley Numero 346 de 2009
Senado, 055 de 2008 Camara, Gaceta del Congreso 912/2009 (17 Sept.) at 1-2
(describing the history of Colombian bankruptcy law).
56 Proyecto de Ley Numero 055 de 2008 Camara, Gaceta del Congreso
494/2008 (1 Aug.) at 8.
57 Id. (citing article 3, point 8, of Law 1116 of 2006, excluding from the
insolvency regime "natural persons who are not merchants").
58 Id.
(citing Constitutional Court Judgment C-699 of 2007); see also Ponencia, supra note 55, at 2-4 (quoting the Constitutional Court decision extensively).
59 Proyecto, supra note 56, at 4, 9 (noting the date of introduction of
House Bill 055 of 2008, "whereby a regime of insolvency for non-merchant
natural persons is established").

60

61

Id. at 7-9.
1d. at 8.
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Centers,6 2 which had been created as part of a National Conciliation Program in 1991.63 This limited "debt conciliation" approach passed through both houses of Congress and in January
2010 became the first legal regime in South America specifically designed to address the insolvency of non-merchant individ64
uals.
The new law was short-lived. The Constitutional Court
declared it void on technical procedural grounds, as the final
vote adopting the reconciled bill was held in an extraordinary
session of Congress, which had not been properly announced by
a timely published decree.6 5 Luckily for Colombian consumers,
their legislators continued to pursue the goal of implementing
the first South American personal insolvency regime. A much
larger project to reenact the Code of Civil Procedure was proceeding through Congress, so within weeks of the Constitutional Court's judgment, lawmakers in the House of Representatives attached the personal insolvency provisions to the bill for
the new Code of Civil Procedure, adding a new Title on the insolvency regime for non-merchant natural persons.6 6 These
provisions remained, however, "in essence eminently concilia67
tory," still not providing for any compulsory discharge of debt.
Meanwhile, the Justice Ministry appointed several experts
to reexamine the personal insolvency provisions incorporated
62 Id. at 4-7 (providing in articles 4-18 for a negotiation procedure with a
stay of ongoing execution proceedings, but otherwise not constraining creditors' right to reject workout agreements and recommence execution).
63 See MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR Y DE JUSTICIA, CONCILIACION Y ARBITRAJE:

NORMATIVIDAD, JURISPRUDENCIA Y CONCEPTOS [MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND
JUSTICE, CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION: REGULATION, JURISPRUDENCE AND
CONCEPTS] 145-46, 175, (2d ed. 2007), available at

http://www.conciliacion.gov.co/archivos/documentos/Publicaciones/Libro/
nciliacion%20y%20arbitraje%202007.pdf.

20co

64

Law 1380 of 2010, Diario Oficial 47603 (25 Jan. 2010).

65

Constitutional Court Communication no. 38, Judgment C-685 (19 Sept.

2011),
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/comunicados/No. 0/ 20 3 8 %/20comuni
cado%2019%20y%2021%20de%20septi
embre%20de%20201 .php;
Corte
tumb6 Ley de Insolvencia Econ6mica para personas naturales [Court
overturns Law on Economic Insolvency for natural persons], Elpais.com.co
(20 Sept. 2011), http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/economia/corte-tumbo-leyinsolvencia-economica-para-personas-naturales.
66 Informe de Ponencia para Segundo Debate al Proyecto de Ley Nflmero
196 de 2011 CAmara, Gaceta del Congreso 745/2011 (4 Oct.) at 29-30, 211-23.
67 Id. at 30.
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into the new Code of Civil Procedure.6 8 Among the individuals
appointed to this group was the main insolvency law expertadvisor to the Superintendent of Companies,6 9 the Colombian
agency in charge of business bankruptcy and restructuring
proceedings. 70 Coincidentally, this expert is also a member of
the World Bank's Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes
Task Force and its Working Group on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons. 71 Consequently, the Superintendent of Companies had access to the first draft of the World
Bank Report, presented to the Working Group in November
2011.72
The Superintendent of Companies' insolvency expert commended the approach of the World Bank Report to the other
experts appointed by the Ministry of Justice, in particular "the
need to include the 'discharge' as part of the new policy." 73 The
Ministry of Justice's expert group reformulated the personal
insolvency provisions, most notably to include a compelled discharge of debt after distribution of the value of the debtor's
non-exempt assets-the most essential theme of the World
Bank Report. 74 After the revised articles on debt negotiation
and discharge were approved by the Ministry of Justice, the
Government proposed that these provisions be included in the

68 Email from Diana Lucia Talero Castro, Superintendency of Companies, to author (July 26, 2013)(on file with author).
6
9 Id.
70 Superintendencia de sociedades, Objetivo Misional,
http://www. supersociedades. gov.co/delegatura-para-procesosdeinsolvencia/obj etivo-misional/Paginas/default. aspx.
71 The expert's name appears on the member list of the Working Group,
which is not a public document but is on file with author. For the background of these two groups, see supra notes 6 and 8 and accompanying text.
72 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. WB REPORT, supra note 1,
8; see also Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes Task Force Meeting
(2011), available at http://go.worldbank.org/X9MIOVN9YO.
73 Email from Diana Lucia Talero Castro, supra note 68; see also Diana
Lucia Talero Castro, Insolvency of Natural Persons in Colombia slide 3,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGILD/Resources/58075541357753286498/Colombia Talero.pdf (PowerPoint presentation at World
Bank, 13 Dececember 2012, noting the new Colombian law is [biased on the
World Bank's report on the treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons").
74 See WB REPORT, supra notes 1
17-18, 25-52, 56-111, 367, 354, 444;
BLOCK-LIEB, supra note 5; KILBORN, supra note 28 at 18 and accompanying
text.
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final bill on the Code of Civil Procedure. 75 Supportive Senators
agreed to do so in March 2012, immediately preceding the first
76
debate on the bill in the Senate (Senado).
Now Title IV of Section Three of Book Three of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 77 the debt negotiation and discharge provi78
sions passed through the legislative reconciliation process
and emerged as part of Law 1564 of 12 July 2012. 79 The provisions enacting the new personal insolvency regime became effective on 1 October 2012,80 though it took a few more months
for the necessary regulatory framework to be put in place by
the Ministry of Justice on 21 December 2012.81
Thanks to the efforts of the Ministry of Justice and the Superintendent of Companies, the new Colombian personal insolvency rules clearly reflect the first major theme of the World
Bank Report: After the distribution among creditors of whatever non-exempt assets the debtor possesses, any debts remaining unpaid "mutate into natural obligations";8 2 that is, they are
legally discharged, becoming morally but not legally enforceable, as "[u]nsatisfied creditors of the debtor cannot pursue assets that the debtor acquires after the initiation of the liquidation procedure."8 3 This is just the sort of relief envisioned and
encouraged in the World Bank Report,8 4 and the new Colombian law implements it in a particularly effective and efficient
15

Email from Diana Lucia Talero Castro, supra note 68.

76 Informe de Ponencia para Primer Debate Proyecto de Ley Nfimero 159

de 2011 Senado, 196 de 2011 CAmara, Gaceta del Congreso 114/2012 (28
Mar.) at 49-114.
77Articles 531 to 576.
78 Informe de Conciliaci6n al Proyecto de Ley Nflmero 159 de 2011
Senado, 196 de 2011 CAmara, Gaceta del Congreso 316/2012 (6 June)
(adopting the bill as passed in the second debate in the Senate).
79 L. 15/109, julio 12, 2012, DIARIO OFICIAL [DO.] (Colom.).
80 Ley 1564 de 2012 art. 627(4).
81 Ministerio de Justicia y del Derecho, Decreto Nfmero 2677 de 21 dic.
2012.
82 CODIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO CIVIL [C.P.C.] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE]

art. 571(1) [hereinafter "CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE"].
83 Id.; see also CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 82, art. 565(2)
("[A]ssets that the debtor acquires after [the opening of insolvency proceedings] may only be pursued by creditors of obligations contracted after this
date.").
84 See W.B. REPORT supra note 1,
367, 354, 444 31-32 and accompanying text.
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way. This is a rare case of two ongoing projects overlapping
quite by coincidence, such that one had a direct and salutary
impact on the other.
The Colombian law powerfully reflects the second of the
World Bank Report's three themes, as well, with its emphasis
on and institutional support for voluntary negotiation with
creditors. As with many other national laws, the Colombian
law is structured around a distinct preference for voluntary,
private or semi-private negotiation, without formal intervention. The law was originally conceived to be only this, a platform for facilitating private workouts of excessive personal
debt.8 5 Until the serendipitous convergence between the progressing Colombian bill and the World Bank project via the dual participation of the Superintendent of Companies, the Colombian law contained little more than a hint of interference
with private ordering and negotiation.8 6 Even in its final form,
though, the Colombian personal insolvency law still distinctly
favors voluntary conciliation between overburdened debtors
and their creditors. Debt negotiation is still listed as the first
objective of the law,8 7 the provisions on debt negotiation proceedings are listed first,8 8 and the only avenue for seeking relief
via a liquidation and discharge is through an attempted but
89
unsuccessful debt negotiation proceeding.
Most important, and also reflecting the World Bank Report's observations on the challenges of out-of-court workouts,
the Colombian regime supports the desired informal solutions
in two particularly impressive ways. First, private debt negotiation fits quite comfortably within a well-established national
program of conciliation of private disputes. 90 A network of conciliation centers spans the country, providing a ready support
See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
87 CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 82, art. 531 (listing the law's
three objectives, two of which involve debt negotiation).
88
Id. arts. 538-62.
89 Id. art. 563 (providing for the opening of a liquidation-and-discharge
proceeding only upon the failure of an attempted debt negotiation under the
preceding provisions, a declaration of nullity of a previously negotiated
workout agreement, or the debtor's failure to fulfill a previously negotiated
workout agreement).
90 On the national conciliation program, spearheaded by the Ministry of
Justice and Law, see http://www.conciliacion.gov.co/.
85
86
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mechanism for non-merchant individuals who otherwise would
be unlikely to have the knowledge and skill to represent themselves effectively in debt negotiations with creditors. 91 This is
precisely the kind of support network that the World Bank Report envisions in its comments on overcoming the numerous
92
barriers to effective privately negotiated solutions.
Second, another key provision entered the law at the same
time as the discharge provision, a new way of regulating when
a "voluntary" workout plan has been accepted and is effective.
Without formal intervention, the simple rule of contract law
would be that a plan that binds any creditor would have to be
accepted by each creditor, since no one creditor's contractual
rights can be altered unilaterally by the debtor, without that
creditor's consent. 93 The Colombian law ensures that an acceptable workout agreement cannot be undermined by a dissenting minority of holdout creditors, however, in its unique
provision on the validity of negotiated plans. For a debt negotiation agreement (called in the law a "payment agreement" 94) to
be valid and effective, it must encompass all of the debtor's
creditors, 95 but it need not be approved by all creditors; rather,
at least two creditors holding claims exceeding 50% of the debtor's total principal debt load must approve the agreement. 96
That is, even if creditors holding 49% of the value of all claims
against the debtor reject a proposed payment plan, the plan is
91 See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text; see also CODE OF CIVIL

supra note 82, art. 533 (assigning responsibility for debt negotiation proceedings first to the existing conciliation centers "expressly authorized by the Ministry of Justice and Law to facilitate [advance] this type of
proceedings, via conciliators registered in their lists" as well as to notary offices, who also have registered conciliators with the proper training required
by regulation); Ministry of Justice and Law, Decree no. 2677 of 21 December
2012, art. 13-15 (requiring specialized training for personal debt conciliators);
Ministry of Justice and Law, Resolution no. 21 of 15 June 2013 (outlining the
minimum content of training programs for conciliators). Both of these regulations
are
available,
in
Spanish
only,
online
at
http://www.conciliacion. gov.co/paginas detalle.aspx?idp= 173.
PROCEDURE,

92 See W.B. REPORT supra note 1,

135, 137.

93 See, e.g., W.B. REPORT, supra note 1, 134 (noting that "one of several
creditors may make settlement impossible through a veto").
94 CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 82, art. 553 ("Acuerdo depago").
95
Id. art. 553(3).
96 Id. art. 553(2) (excluding claims for interest, fines, and penalties, legal
or contractual, from the total debt load).
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nonetheless imposed on these dissenters if creditors holding a
majority of the value of claims approves the plan. If this plan
is successfully completed by the debtor, 97 all of the claims encompassed within the plan are considered fully satisfied, and
no further enforcement may be pursued on those claims
98
against the debtor, co-debtors, or guarantors.
Finally, the Colombian law takes a rare approach in rejecting the third theme of a required payment plan as part of the
"earned start" discharge process. The alternative to a negotiated payment plan is a distribution to creditors of the debtor's
available assets, followed by an immediate and unconditional
discharge-without any provision for payments from the debtors' future income. 99 Perhaps this is part of a larger strategy
that dovetails with the law's emphasis on voluntary conciliation. As noted above,1 00 the Colombian regime requires debtors
to seek assistance from conciliation centers (or other sources)
for negotiating settlement arrangements with creditors before
seeking coercive relief in the form of a discharge.10 1 But the law
indirectly pressures creditors to accept whatever payment the
debtor reasonably has to offer from his or her future income,
since if creditors reject that, they are likely to receive little or
nothing of value from the debtor's meagre present assets. Most
personal insolvency cases around the world reveal little or no
value in the debtor's present assets.1 0 2 By refusing to allow
creditors to access debtors' future income in the liquidationand-discharge process, the Colombian law may have struck on
an ingenious strategy for leveraging greater voluntary payment
agreements in the first stage of insolvency proceedings.

91 The expected duration of such plans is five years, though longer terms

are allowed with the assent of 60% of creditors or for claims with an original
maturity period exceeding five years. Id. art. 553(10).
98
Id. art. 558.
99
1d. arts. 563-71.
100 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
101 The Colombian regime thus joins that in "many countries" with a twostage procedure of required negotiation followed by formal, compelled insolvency relief. See W.B. REPORT, supra note 1, 129.
102 See id.
221 (noting that "the overwhelming majority of debtors in
every existing system ... have proven to have few if any assets of any value
that are available for liquidation and distribution to creditors").
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B. Italy
Italy took an almost identical path to its first personal insolvency regime as did Colombia. The final result, however,
was markedly different. Just as Colombia did, Italy started
down this path hesitantly, adopting a law in January 2012103
that simply provided a statutory framework for negotiated debt
settlements.1 0 4 Indeed, such settlements were binding only on
creditors who agreed, requiring full (though slightly deferred)
payment to dissenting creditors. 10 5 Moreover, debtors could
propose such settlements to their creditors only with the intermediation of so-called Crisis Composition Bodies (Organismo di composizione della crisi), a new institution whose members would be drawn from business mediation bodies and
professional associations of lawyers, notaries, and accountants.106 The fledgling negotiation procedure was all but doomed
to failure, and in the first eight months of its effectiveness, only
10 7
two cases were filed, one each in Rome and Florence.
The Government had anticipated this problem. It had attempted twice in the first months of 2012 to propose more effective relief in the form of a non-negotiated discharge, but its
103 Law of 27 January 2012, no. 3 (G.U. no. 24, 30 Jan. 2012 ), Disposizioni in materia di usura e di estorsione, nonch6 di composizione delle
crisi da sovraindebitamento [Regulation on usury and extortion, as well as on
settlement of overindebtedness crises] [hereinafterLaw 3/2012].
104 Study on Means to Protect Consumers in FinancialDifficulty: Personal
Bankruptcy, datio in solutum of Mortgages, and Restrictions on Debt Collection Abusive
Practices, London Economics 64
(Contract
No
MARKT/2011/023/B2/ST/FC
2012),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal market/finservicesretail/docs/fsug/papers/debt solutions report en.pdf.
105 Id.; see also Giorgio Cherubini, New Italian law for over-indebtedness,
EUROFENIX
(Winter 2012/13)
at 36,
online at www.insoleurope.org/download/file /8408.
106 Cherubini, supra note 105, at,37 n. 4.
107 Decreto di Legge 18 ottobre 2012, n. 3533 (It.). no. 3533, Conversione
in legge del decreto-legge 18 ottobre 2012, n. 179, recante ulteriori misure urgenti per la crescita del Paese (19 Oct. 2012) [Draft Law no. 3533, Conversion
into law of decree-law 18 October 2012, n. 179, concerning further urgent
measures for the country's growth], Relazione [Introductory Report of the
Government] at 39, online at
http://www.senato.it/japp/bgt/showdoc/16/DDLPRES/681211/index.html;
http://www.legautonomie.it/content/download/8831/46405/file/S.3533.pdf
[hereinafterRelazione 179/2012].
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efforts had been rebuffed by the legislature.10 8 While the record
contains no indication that the Government's reform efforts
were influenced by the World Bank Report, the first draft of
which had just been released a few months earlier at the end of
2011, the timing is remarkable. 109
Finally in the fall of 2012, the Government tied its desired
insolvency reforms to a much larger bill aimed at spurring economic growth. 110 Introducing the new personal insolvency provisions, the Government attributed the "structural failure" of
the January 2012 debt settlement law to Italy's failure to conform its laws to comparative analysis: "all countries in which a
regulation is provided for the resolution of economic crises like
the one with which we are dealing, have opted for a bankruptcy
instrument with a discharge, and not negotiated [solutions] of a
transitory nature."1 1' 1 Further shaming legislators with this
comparative point, the Government observed that even neighboring Greece had adopted a personal discharge law in 2010,
leaving Italy in the company of countries such as China, Vietnam, Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Hungary without an effective
discharge law. 112 The legislature reacted swiftly, passing the
proposed reforms of Law No. 3 of January 2012 into law on 17
December 2012.113
Reflecting the World Bank Report's first theme, the reform
law modifies the earlier Law no. 3 of 2012 to include an express
provision for a non-negotiated discharge of unsatisfied debts
following official liquidation of the debtor's non-exempt properlO8
Id.
109 Moreover, the Working Group and the Task Force included several
Italian members, one of whom later wrote of Decree-Law 179/2012 that it
represented Italy's coming into line with other Western systems "in conformity with the recommendations of the World Bank." Luciano Panzani, La
Composizione della Crisi da Sovraindebitamento dopo ilD.L. 179/2012, at 2
(2013) [Settlement of Overindebtedness Crises per Decree-Law 179/2012],
http://www.treccani.it/magazine/diritto/approfondimenti/diritto processuale
civile e delle procedure concorsuali/2 Panzani sovraindebitamento 2.html.
110 Decree-Law of 18 Oct. 2012, no. 179, Ulteriori misure urgenti per la
crescita del Paese art. 18 [Further urgent measures for the country's growth]
(G.U. no. 245, 19 Oct. 2012, ordinary supplement, at 20-28).
111 Id.
1121Id.

113 Law 17 Dec. 2012, no. 221, art. 18 (G.U. no. 294, 18 Dec. 2012, ordinary supplement, at 21-23).
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ty. 114

The liquidation process unfolds over the course of four
years, however, and any and all non-exempt property the debtor acquires during this period must be turned over to the liquidator. 115 This includes a portion of the debtor's income during
this four-year period, as discussed below. Indeed, the Italian
law is explicit in its expectation that the debtor will do everything reasonably possible to earn a fresh start. Among the requirements for discharge is that the debtor, during the fouryear liquidation period, "has engaged in ...income-producing

activity commensurate with his own abilities and the situation
of the market or, in any case, has sought work and has not re1 16
fused, without justification, any proposals for employment."
The Italian law thus takes the more common "earned start"
approach, rather than the straight "fresh start" approach of the
117
Colombian law.
The second World Bank theme of favoring settlements is
reflected here, as well. As in the case of Colombia, Italy began
in January 2012 with a simple framework for facilitating voluntary settlements with creditors. 118 Only at the end of that
year did the notion of a court-ordered discharge enter the law,
and the liquidation procedure is tellingly described as an "alternative to the proposal for crisis settlement."1 19 Unlike the
Colombian law, the liquidation and discharge in the Italian
law are not secondary and succeed proceedings to the preferred
settlement negotiations. This is a free-standing procedure;
debtors need not seek any compromise with their creditors be120
fore pursuing liquidation-and-discharge relief.
114 Law 3/2012, supra note 103, art. 14-terdecies (offering "the benefit of
a clearance
of residual debts").
115
Id. arts. 14-quinquies (4), 14-novies (2), (5), 14-undecies.
116 Law 3/2012, supra note 103, art. 14-terdecies (1)(e). This fairly uncommon provision is strikingly similar to an earlier one in the German law
governing personal insolvency and discharge. See Ins [Insolvency Act] §
295(1)(1) (2013), available at
http://www. gesetze-im-internet. de/inso/ 295.html.
"I See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
118 See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
119 Law 3/2012, supra note 103, art. 14-ter. (1).
120 Law 3/2012, supra note 103, art. 14-ter (listing the requirements for
opening liquidation proceedings, not including debt settlement negotiation);
See also Law 3/2012, supra note 103, art. 14-decies (listing the conditions for
a discharge, not including debt settlement negotiation).
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Further potentially weakening the debt settlement process, the Italian proceeding is not constructed on as solid a
foundation as that in Colombia1 21 (or, as discussed below, Ireland). 122 On the one hand, the Italian law recognizes the need
for institutional support for debtors in proposing and administering debt settlement plans. But it continues to rely on newly121

See conciliation program, supra note 90; See also CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, supra note 82, at art. 533 (assigning responsibility for debt negotiation proceedings first to the existing conciliation centers "expressly authorized by the Ministry of Justice and Law to facilitate [advance] this type of
proceedings, via conciliators registered in their lists" as well as to notary offices, who also have registered conciliators with the proper training required
by regulation); Ministry of Justice and Law, Decree no. 2677 of 21 December
2012, art. 13-15 (requiring specialized training for personal debt conciliators);
Ministry of Justice and Law, Resolution no. 21 of 15 June 2013 (outlining the
minimum content of training programs for conciliators). Both of these regulations
are
available,
in
Spanish
only,
online
at
http://www.conciliacion.gov.co/paginas detalle.aspx?idp=173; Proyeeto, supra
note 56, at 4-7(providing in articles 4-18 for a negotiation procedure with a
stay of ongoing execution proceedings, but otherwise not constraining creditors' right to reject workout agreements and recommence execution); see
MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR Y DE JUSTICIA, CONCILIACION Y ARBITRAJE, supra

note 63, at 145-146,175.
122 Proyecto, supra note 56, at 4-7(providing in articles 4-18 for a negotiation procedure with a stay of ongoing execution proceedings, but otherwise
not constraining creditors' right to reject workout agreements and recommence execution); see MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR Y DE JUSTICIA, CONCILIACION Y
ARBITRAJE, supra note 63, at 145-146,175;See conciliation program, supra
note 90; See also CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 82, art. 533 (assigning
responsibility for debt negotiation proceedings first to the existing conciliation centers "expressly authorized by the Ministry of Justice and Law to facilitate [advance] this type of proceedings, via conciliators registered in their
lists" as well as to notary offices, who also have registered conciliators with
the proper training required by regulation); Ministry of Justice and Law, Decree no. 2677 of 21 December 2012, art. 13-15 (requiring specialized training
for personal debt conciliators); Ministry of Justice and Law, Resolution no. 21
of 15 June 2013 (outlining the minimum content of training programs for
conciliators). Both of these regulations are available, in Spanish only, online
at http://www.conciliacion.gov.co/paginas detalle.aspx?idp=173.; See also
Cherubini, supra note 105, at 37 n.4..; Law 3/2012, supra note 103, arts. 7(1),
9, 11, 13, 15 (establishing in Article 15 that these bodies' qualifications and
permissible fees will be regulated by the Ministry of Justice in consultation
with the Ministry of Economic Development and Ministry of Economy and
Finance).;See PIA 2012 §§ 48-54, 64, 75, 98, 112, 159-86; Insolvency Service,

What is a personal insolvency practitioner?

INSOLVENCY SERV.

OF IR,

http://www.isi.gov.ie/en/ISI/Pages/Practitioner (providing numerous links
with further information).; See PIA 2012 §§ 7-24. (The Insolvency Service has
a very useful website available at www.isi.gov.ie); See WB Report, supra note
1,
135, 137.
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established and untested "Crisis Composition Bodies" 123 to
evaluate debtors' financial history and future payment capacity, formulate proposed settlement plans, evaluate such plans
and report to the court, collect creditor votes on proposals, and
administer plans accepted by creditors. 124 It remains to be seen
how this new institution will develop, especially given the law's
insistence that, from the constitution and operation of these
bodies, there "shall not derive any new or additional burdens
on public finance." 125 One commentator has already expressed
some doubt in light of the patently conflicting interests these
126
bodies are called upon to serve.
Moreover, the desired benefits of the settlement alternative are undermined by a greater than usual degree of participation by the courts. The proceeding is initiated with a court
filing of the debtor's proposed plan and a detailed report from
the Crisis Composition Body on, among other things, the plan's
feasibility. 127 The court assesses the proposal and sends it to
creditors to solicit their assent (or rejection). 128 Finally, the
court must pass on any objections to the plan and confirm its
implementation. 129 While this process is an improvement over
full-blown court-based litigation, it leaves something to be desired in terms of unencumbering the courts and delegating authority to the out-of-court support system.
On the positive side, like the Colombian law, 130 the Italian
rules include powerful leverage measures against holdouts
from settlements. Creditors who fail to vote on the debtor's

123 Cherubini, supra note 105, at 36, 37 n.4.; Law 3/2012, supra note 103,
art. 15 (establishing that these bodies' qualifications and permissible fees will
be regulated by the Ministry of Justice in consultation with the Ministry of
Economic Development and Ministry of Economy and Finance).
124 Law 3/2012, supra note 103, arts. 7(1), 9, 11, 13, 15.
125 Id. art. 15(4) (noting some availability of financing for such bodies under current law). One commentator reacts to this limitation of funding by
concluding "[t]his provision does not leave much hope in terms of professionalism and efficiency." See also Panzani, supra note 109, at 15.
126 See Panzani, supra note 109, at 29.
127 Law 3/2012, supra note 103, art. 9.
128 Id. arts. 10,11(1) (directing creditors to submit their votes to the Crisis Composition
Body).
129
Id. arts. 12,13.
130 See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
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settlement proposal are deemed to assent to it.131 So long as
creditors holding at least 60% of all claims either vote or are
deemed to vote in favor of the proposal, the settlement becomes
binding on all ordinary creditors. 132 Given the lack of financial
support for the institutions in the center of this process, as well
as the ease with which debtors can seek more direct and predictable relief in the liquidation-and-discharge process, it
seems safe to predict that the debt settlement process is no
1 33
better under the now-revised law than under the original.
As for the third World Bank Report theme, the Italian law
follows the growing trend in expecting debtors to earn their
fresh start, though it does not formulate that expectation with
the kind of care that international best practices seem to call
for. Admirably, the four-year payment period seems relatively
moderate in the context of worldwide trends.1 34 Indeed, this
term was chosen "in line with the models of other countries,"
with the intent not to squeeze several years of income from
debtors to compensate creditors, but rather to dissuade debtors
from seeking the benefit lightly or abusively.1 35 As for the
amount of payment to be made during this time, the Italian
law also admirably focuses on the debtor's ability to bear the
burden, not on any minimum payment or expected dividend to
1 36
creditors, as suggested in the World Bank Report.
Law 3/2012, supra note 103, art. 11(1).
Id. arts. 11(2), 12(3) (discussing that alternatively, a consumer debtor
can submit a proposal for court approval without soliciting creditor support,
in which case the court may confirm such a plan (binding on all creditors) so
long as it is feasible and the debtor has not undertaken obligations without a
reasonable prospect of being able to satisfy them and has not engaged in borrowing disproportionate to his or her financial capacity.). Id. arts. 12-bis, 12ter. These subjective requirements seem likely to be seldom established. See
Panzani, supra note 109, at 17 (noting that it is "a notion of common experience" that over indebtedness arises from consumers' excessive recourse to
credit and their lack of adequate financial education).
133 Relazione 179/2012, supra note 107 and accompanying text.
134 See WB Report, supra note 1,
268 (noting a standard of 3 to 5 years,
with a convergence around 5-year payment terms).
135 Relazione 179/2012, supra note 107 at 44.
136. WB Report, supra note 1,
357, 274; See also Law 3/2012, supra
note 103, art. 14-terdecies (1)(f) (noting that the law does require that creditors be satisfied at least "in part,", but so long as courts interpret the law to
keep this "part" within very modest bounds, one would expect any debtor to
be able to pay one or two ceremonial Euros to creditors over the course of four
years.).
131

132
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Unfortunately, the Italian law falls into a common and serious trap identified in the Report, 137 in that it assigns the
court apparently unfettered discretion in determining an acceptable budget to be reserved for debtors' and their families'
ordinary living expenses during the four-year liquidation period. While the exemptions for hard assets are made parallel
with those in ordinary execution law, 138 the exemption for the
debtor's future income does not take the common approach of
relying on general income protections (e.g., garnishment restrictions). 139 Rather, the court is assigned responsibility for determining, with no guidance from any statute, regulation, or
guideline, how much of the debtor's future income to reserve as
"necessary for the maintenance of [the debtor] and of his family." 140 With their applications for relief, debtors must submit a
"list of current expenditures necessary to support [themselves
and their families]." 141 However, there is no clear connection
between this statement and the court's determination of an appropriate budget going forward. This could represent a disaster for debtors and the new insolvency regime if courts tend to
impose unworkably sparse household budgets, or if judges in
different areas of the country adopt widely varying approaches
142
to determining budgets.
C. Ireland
While the process and result of producing the new Irish
consumer insolvency regime were not directly influenced by the
World Bank Report, the same themes are clearly reflected in
both projects. This is in part due to the fact that, as discussed
below, the principal report that drove the Irish process relied
heavily on two of the primary sources underlying the World
Bank's Report. The debate about how to deal with excessive
WB Report, supra note 1, 267, 285-90.
3/2012, supra note 103, art. 14-ter (6)(d).
139 See WB Report, supra note 1, 292.
140 Law 3/2012, supra note 103, arts. 14-ter (6)(b), 14-quinquies (2)(f)
(containing in art. 14-quinquies (2)(f) an obviously erroneous reference to art.
14-ter (5)(b), intended to refer to art. 14-ter (6)(b), as art. 14-ter (5) has no
subsections).
141
Id. arts. 9(2), 14-ter (2).
142 See WB Report, supra note 1,
287-88 (describing these problems in
137

138 Law

other systems).
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consumer debt and many individuals' inability to pay those
debts has long simmered in Ireland, however.
Well into the 21st century, the Irish system of debt enforcement continued the anachronistic procedure of allowing
defaulting debtors to be imprisoned for simple failure to pay a
civil debt. 143 While proposals for reform of this long-outdated
method of debt collection were formulated by the Irish Government in the late 1990s, 144 individual debtors were still being
145
jailed for simple non-payment of civil debts in the late 2000s.
During this same span of time, from the late 1990s to the late
2000s, Irish consumers were racking up debts at unprecedented levels. The national ratio of household debt to disposable
income rose nearly four-fold, from a moderate 48% to a dangerous 176%, an even steeper rise than in debt-riddled countries
1 46
like the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada.
While Ireland had a formal bankruptcy system that theoretically provided for relief in the form of a discharge of unpaid
debts, the law was dysfunctional and seldom used by individual
debtors for a host of reasons. A 2009 report from the Irish legislative research service observed curtly that the bankruptcy system was "expensive and ... unsuitable for a majority of debtors," further explaining that it failed to provide for an
automatic discharge of debt in any case.1 47 Rather, to obtain the
possibility of relief, a debtor had to pay in full the hefty admin143 See, e.g., Joseph Spooner, Long Overdue: What The Belated Reform of
Irish Personal Insolvency Law Tells Us About Comparative Consumer Bankruptcy, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 243, 249 (2012) (reporting that, in 2008 alone, 276
debtors were imprisoned pursuant to what the author characterizes as "a
Kafkaesque procedure").

144

See Paul Joyce, An End Based on Means?,

FREE LEGAL ADVICE

CENTRES
13
(2003),
http://www.flac.ie/download/pdf/an end based on means.pdf.
145 See Spooner, supra note 143 and accompanying text; Stuart Stamp, A
Policy Framework for Addressing Over-indebtedness, COMBAT POVERTY
AGENCY 35 (2009), availableat http://www.combatpoverty.ie/publications/
APolicyFrameworkForAddressingOverIndebtedness 2009.pdf.
146 The Debt of the Nation: How we fell in and out of love with debt,
AMARACH RESEARCH 4-5 (2009), available at http://www.amarach.com/assets/
files/The%/20Debt%/20of%20the%/20Nation.pdf.
147 Spotlight: Debt Part 2: Personal Debt and Consequences, OIREACHTAS
LIBR.
&
RES.
SERV.
15-16
(2010),
available
at
http://circleofdebt.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/personal-debt-and consequen
ces.pdf.
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istrative costs of the formal process, turn over all non-exempt
property acquired during the course of the next twelve years,
and even after all this, the court might enter a discharge order
only upon a finding that it would be "reasonable and proper" to
grant such extraordinary relief. 148 Such an expensive system,
offering relief that is both too little and too late, is obviously of
little use to people desperately in need of financial rehabilitation.
As in Colombia 49 and Italy, 150 the first Irish policy response to the problem of consumer debt default was to set up a
framework for helping consumers to manage their own financial affairs and, ultimately, to facilitate private, negotiated settlements between debtors and their creditors.151 In 1992, the
Irish Government's Department of Social and Family Affairs
set up a pilot program of five Money Advice and Budgeting
152
Service (MABS) centers, fully funded by the Department.
The initial purpose of MABS was to offer advice and assistance
to low-income families who had been victimized by illegal, highcost moneylenders, but the successful pilot project quickly grew
into a formal service offering generalized money and budgeting
advice in 65 centers throughout Ireland. 153
In 2003, MABS implemented a pilot initiative with the
Irish Bankers Federation to establish a framework for voluntary debt settlements involving a partial write-off of unsustainable consumer debt. 154 This pilot project was limited to 100
148

Id. at 16.

Proyecto, supra note 56, at 4-8 and accompanying text (providing in
articles 4-18 for a negotiation procedure with a stay of ongoing execution proceedings, but otherwise not constraining creditors' right to reject workout
agreements and recommence execution); see also MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR Y
DE JUSTICIA, CONCILIACION Y ARBITRAJE, supra note 63, at 145-146,175 and
accompanying text; See also Law 1380 of 2010, supra note 64.
150 See Law 3/2012, supra note 103 and accompanying text; See also
Study on Means to Protect Consumers in FinancialDifficulty, supra note 104
and accompanying text.
151 See OIREACHTAS LIBR. & RES. SERV., supra note 147, at 3, 14 (observing
in 2009 that "Ireland's response to over-indebtedness has largely focused on
funding MABS.").
152 Joyce, supra note 144, at 29.
153 Id.; Dieter Korczak, The Money Advice and Budgeting Service Ireland,
PEER REVIEW IN THE FIELD OF SOCIAL INCLUSION POLICIES13 (2004),
http://www.euro.centre.org/data/1138965609 36492.pdf.
154 Joyce, supra note 144, at 66-67 (describing the details of the project);
149
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cases from select areas of Dublin, and it was not extended beyond those few cases, lasting only a few years. 155 MABS and
IBF renewed their debt settlement initiative in 2009, however,
with an "operational protocol" for negotiating "mutuallyacceptable, affordable and sustainable repayment plan[s]" explicitly committing a list of key institutional creditors "to accept payment that may be less than the full amount of the debt
owed."156 Early evaluations of this new protocol were quite positive from both the creditor and debtor side, 157 but its salutary
effects were limited by the small group of creditors who had
signed on. 158 And for debtors with little or no wherewithal to
make significant payments to their creditors, the protocol could
offer little or no relief.
A path had been cleared for a more broadly applicable,
formal, legislative solution, which would soon receive powerful
impetus from two sources. The first would come from an influential voice within Ireland; the second from outside forces
drawn in after Ireland as a country experienced the spectacular
shock of national and international economic crisis. With such
potent political forces converging around them, Irish lawmakers were all but forced to modernize their law in line with the
159
principal themes of the World Bank's Report.
First, Ireland has an impressive institution, the Law Reform Commission (LRC), dedicated to constantly reviewing and
evaluating Irish law and making suggestions for reform when
needed. 16 0 One of the main drivers of the LRC's work are its
See also Korczak, supra note 153, at 4.
155 Joyce, supra note 144, at 66; See also OIREACHTAS LIBR., supra note
147, at 16 (reporting that the project was terminated in 2006, with no report
of its success).
156 IBF-MABS Operational Protocol: Working Together to Manage Debt,
IRISH BANKING FEDERATION § 1 (2009), http://www.ibf.ie/pdfs/IBF-MABSProtocol-June09.pdf.
157Interim Report: Personal Debt Management and Debt Enforcement,
LAW
REFORM
COMMISSION
46
(2010),
http://www.lawreform.ie/ fileupload/Reports/irDebt.pdf (reporting that "the
Protocol has delivered generally positive results in terms of agreed repayment arrangements between IBF creditors and MABS clients").
158
Id. at 45-46.
159 See Spooner, supra note 143, at 288-96 (explaining the process leading
to the reform of Irish personal insolvency law).
160 Overview, LAW REFORM COMMISSION, http://www.lawreform.ie/lawreform/overview. 445.html.
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periodic Programmes of Law Reform, which are developed by
the LRC and subsequently approved by the Government and
placed before the legislature (both Houses of the Oireachtas). 16 1
Since its inception in 1975, the LRC has developed and pursued three such Programmes. 1 2 It has produced over 160 consultation papers and reports making proposals for law reform,
and as a clear testament to the LRC's influence on Irish law,
16 3
"[Im]ost of these proposals have led to reforming legislation."
After a public consultation process that drew a significant
number of submissions calling for reform of the law related to
personal debt enforcement, the LRC included this topic in its
Third Programme of Law Reform, approved by the Government
in 2007.164 Like the World Bank Report, the LRC's project on
"Personal Debt Management and Debt Enforcement" drew
heavily on two other European sources:16 5 a European Commission report on personal over indebtedness 6 6 and the Council of
Europe's Recommendation on legal solutions to debt problems. 16 7 Unsurprisingly, these common sources led the LRC
161

Id.

Programmes of Law Reform, LAW REFORM COMMISSION,
http://www. lawreform. ie/law-reform/law-reform/ourprogrammes-of-lawreform. 127.html.
163 Report: Personal Debt Management and Debt Enforcement, LAW
162

REFORM

COMMISSION

ii

(2010),

available

at

http://www.lawreform.ie/ fileupload/Reports/rl00Debt.pdf. [hereinafter, LRC
Report].
164 Id. at ii, 1; Consultation Paper: Personal Debt Management and Debt
Enforcement, LAW REFORM COMMISSION 1, 3 (2009), http://www.lawreform.ie
/ fileupload/consultation%20papers/Consultation%20Paper%20on%20Person
al%20Debt%20Management%20and%20Debt%20Enforcement FINAL%20D
RAFT.pdf [hereinafter, LRC Consultation Paper] (commenting that the
Commission's "primary focus ... is on ... personal insolvency laws and legal
debt enforcement proceedings").
165 LRC Consultation Paper, supra note 164, at 1-3; LRC Report, supra
note 163, at 1.
166 Towards A Common
Operational European Definition of OverIndebtedness, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2008), available atec.europa.eu/social/
BlobServlet?docld=5093&langld=en (also cited as a primary source in the
World Bank's Report, supra note 1, at 21(c)).
167 Commission Recommendation to Member States on Legal Solutions to
Debt Problems, COM (2007) 999bis final (Jun. 20, 2007) (explaining the
World Bank Report cited and relied on the expert report on which the Councils Recommendation was based); Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen & Ann-Sofie
Henrikson, Bureau of the European Committee on Legal Co-Operation
(CDCJ-BU), Report on Legal Solutions to Debt Problems In Credit Societies
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and the World Bank Working Group to similar conclusions.
The LRC's initial Consultation Paper echoed the criticisms
168
that have long been levelled at the Irish bankruptcy system;
6
9
i.e., that it was far too expensive
and far too parsimonious in
7
0
its offer of reliefl to be of any use to the overwhelming majority of debtors.1 71 For the few cases that made it past the opening
phase, the LRC bristled at the 12-year discharge period, which
it characterized as "excessively long and contrast[ing] sharply
with the fresh start principle which characterizes modern consumer insolvency codes."1 72 While the LRC concluded that "a
comprehensive review of bankruptcy legislation lies outside the
scope of' its reform agenda,1 73 its final Report nonetheless offered a detailed analysis of key proposed bankruptcy reforms;
concentrating on the introduction of an automatic discharge after a three-year period during which the debtor might be called
1 74
upon to make payments to creditors from surplus income.
While the amount of these payments in the bankruptcy context
was not expressly addressed, similar payments were considered in the context of out-of-court settlements, including the
necessity of leaving sufficient income with debtors to support a
reasonable standard of living.1 75 But no specific approach was
suggested here, as the LRC conceded "the calculation of reasonable living expenses is an issue lying far outside the competence of a law reform body."176 The clear concentration of the
(2005),
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cdcj/CJSDEBT/CDCJBU 2005 le%20rev.pdf; See WB Report, supra note 1, at 2 1(b).
168 See, e.g., OIREACHTAS LIBR. & RES.SERV., supra note 147, at 3, 16.
169 LRC Consultation Paper, supra note 164, at 113, 116 (criticizing the
requirements that debtors seeking relief prove that a liquidation of their assets will produce at least 1900 Euros, and that they deposit 650 Euros with
the bankruptcy administrator, along with any further sums necessary to cover ongoing administrative costs of fees).
170 LRC Consultation Paper, supra note 164, at 113-14 (criticizing the requirements for a discharge as "severely onerous by international standards.")
171 LRC Consultation Paper, supra note 164, at 114 (observing the
miniscule numbers of bankruptcy petitions filed and cases opened in recent
years, e.g., only 20 petitions in 2007 with only four leading to opened cases).
172 LRC Consultation Paper, supra note 164, at 117.
173 LRC Consultation Paper, supra note 164, at 122.
174 LRC Report, supra note 163, at 145-86, 319-21, 413-16 (allowing the
court to require payments for up to 5 years).
175 LRC Report, supra at 93-95, 314, 372-73.
176 LRC Report, supra at 94.
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LRC's review and final Report was on a new system of nonjudicial debt settlements, along the lines of the MABS-IBF initiatives, 177 but overseen by a central government regulator, extending to all creditors, and resting on a broader and more
formalized institutional foundation. 178 Thus, the three themes
of the World Bank's Report appeared prominently at this early
stage in the reform process, advanced with the considerable
persuasive force of the national institution most responsible for
driving forward Irish law reform.
An equally if not more powerful law reform force, would
exert its influence in the wake of the devastating impact of the
global financial crisis in Ireland. A collapse in property values
and bank balance sheets led to a cascade of negative effects on
state revenue collection, credit availability and unemployment,
plunging Ireland into a particularly severe recession from 2008
to 2010.179 Ireland's GDP suffered a cumulative decline of more
than 20% between the first quarter of 2008 and the third quarter of 2010.180 Though the treasury was bringing in fewer tax
receipts, the Irish Government resorted to heavy deficit spending to bail out the banking sector and attempt to reign in the
exploding economic crisis.18 1 This undermined the nation's
credit reputation in international markets, effectively shutting
off a vital source of financing.18 2 The massive scope of the problem required large-scale external assistance.
In November 2010, Irish authorities formally requested
177 Joyce, supra at 29, 66-67 (describing on pages 66-67 the details of the
projects); Korczak, supra note 153 at 4, 13; OIREACHTAS LIBR. & RES. SERV.,
supra 16, (reporting that the project was terminated in 2006, with no report
of its success); JBF-MABS OperationalProtocol: Working Together to Manage
Debt, IRISH
BANKING
FEDERATION
§
1
(2009),
available at
http ://www.ibf.ie/pdfs/IBF-MABS-Protocol-JuneO9.pdf;
LAW
REFORM
COMMISSION, supra note 157 at 46 (reporting that "the Protocol has delivered
generally positive results in terms of agreed repayment arrangements between IBF creditors and MABS clients).
178 LRC Consultation Paper, supra note 164, at 122; LRC Report, supra
note 163, at 5-110, 307-16, 349-73.
179 Philip R. Lane, The Irish Crisis, THE WORLD FINANCIAL REVIEW (2011)
http://www.worldfinancialreview.com/?p=874.
180 Lane, supra note 179.

181 Representation in Ireland, Ireland's economic crisis: how did it happen and what is being done about it?, EUROPEAN COMM'N, (Feb. 22, 2012),
http://ec.europa.eu/ireland/economy/irelands economic crisis/index en.htm.
182 Representation in Ireland, supra.
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financial assistance from the European Union, the European
Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund (often referred to colloquially as "the Troika").18 3 This assistance was
made contingent on Irish authorities' undertaking several
steps to reform the financial sector and increase growth potential. In an initial Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, the Council of the European Union outlined several steps
that Ireland was expected to take as part of the assistance program. 184 One of these, related to the primary goal of restoring
financial sector viability, was to "reform the personal insolvency regime ... [to] balance the interests of both creditors and

debtors." 185 These reforms would "include a non-judicial debt
settlement and enforcement mechanism as an alternative to
court-supervised proceedings." 186 The European Commission
187
was charged with monitoring progress toward these reforms,
and it laid out quarterly goal for their achievement, including
in the very first quarter of the program "[a]n in-depth review of
the personal debt regime," 188 which was forthcoming within
days from the LRC, as described above. 189 By the first quarter
183 Economic and Financial Affairs, Council agrees on joint EU-IMF financial assistance package for Ireland, EUROPEAN COMM'N, (Jul. 12, 2010),
http://ec.europa.eu/economy finance/articles/eu economic situation/2010-120 1-financial-assistanceireland en.htm.
184 Council of the European Union, Memorandum of Economic and FinancialPolicies 1 (Dec. 7, 2010),http://ec.europa.eu/economy finance/articles/
eu economic situation/pdf/2010-12-07-mefp en.pdf.
185 Council of European Union, supra at 4
16.
186 Council of European Union, supra at 4
16.
187 Council Implementing Decision 2011/77/EU, on Granting Union Financial Assistance to Ireland, 2010 O.J. (L 30), 34,
8,
http://ec.europa.eu/economy finance/articles/eu economic situation/pdf/20 1012-07-council imp decision en.pdf.
188 European Commission, Ireland Memorandum of Understanding on
Specific
Economic
Policy
Conditionality 6
(Dec.
3,
2010),
http://ec.europa.eu/economy finance/articles/eu economic situation/pdf/20 1012-07-mou en.pdf.
189 LRC Report, supra note 163 at 93-95, 145-86, 314, 319-21, 372-73,
413-16 (allowing the court to require payments for up to 5 years); LRC Consultation Paper, supra note 164, at 122; Joyce, supra at 29, 66-67 (describing
on pages 66-67 the details of the projects); Korczak, supra note 153 at 4, 13;
OIREACHTAS LIBR. & RES. SERV., supra 16, (reporting that the project was
terminated in 2006, with no report of its success); IBF-MABS Operational
Protocol: Working Together to Manage Debt, IRISH BANKING FEDERATION § 1
(2009), available at http://www.ibf.ie/pdfs/IBF-MABS-Protocol-JuneO9.pdf;
LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 157 at 46 (reporting that "the Protocol
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of 2012, reform legislation was expected to be presented to the
Irish legislature. 190
With the internal political process already primed for reform of the personal insolvency regime, the Troika's external
goading simply increased the pace of progress already well underway. In January 2012, the Minister for Justice and Equality
announced a draft bill, in large part implementing the LRC's
recommendations discussed above,19 1 for reforming the bankruptcy law and implementing several non-judicial debt settlement schemes.19 2 A conforming Government bill was introduced into the legislature in June 2012.193 The virtually
unchanged bill was eventually adopted before being signed into
law on 26 December 2 0 12.194 The Personal Insolvency Act 2012
became effective at various points in 2013, with the final piece,
the bankruptcy reforms, becoming effective on 3 December
2013.195 While still subject to substantial criticism,19 6 the Irish
has delivered generally positive results in terms of agreed repayment arrangements between IBF creditors and MABS clients).
190 European Commission, Ireland Memorandum of Understanding on
Specific
Economic
Policy
Conditionality
11
(Dec.
3,
2010),
http://ec.europa.eu/economy finance/articles/eu economic situation/pdf/20 1012-07-mou en.pdf.
191 See supra notes 173-77 and accompanying text. LRC Consultation Paper, supra note 164, at 122; LRC Report, supra note 163, at 145-86, 319-21,
413-16 (allowing the court to require payments for up to 5 years); See Id. at
93-95, 314, 372-73; Id. at 94; see Joyce, supra note 144, at 29, 66-67 and accompanying text; Korcak, supra note 153, at 4, 13 and accompanying text;
OIREACHTAS LIBR.., supra note 147, at 16 (reporting that the project was terminated in 2006, with no report of its success) and accompanying text; IRISH
BANKING FEDERATION, supra note 156, § 1 and accompanying text; LAW
REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 157, at 46 and accompanying text.

192 Department of Justice and Equality, Minister Shatter and Minister
Noonan publish Scheme of Personal Insolvency Bill
(25 Jan. 2012),
http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/PR 12000013.
193 Personal Insolvency Bill 2012 as initiated and Explanatory Memorandum, HOUSE OF THE OIREACHTAS, available at http://www.oireachtas.ie/

viewdoc.asp?fn=/documents/bills28/bills/2012/5812/b58112d.pdf.
194 Personal Insolvency Act 2012 (Act No. 44/2012) (Jr.) [hereinafter, PIA
2012], availableat http://www.isi.gov.ie/en/ISI/Personal%/201nsolvency%/20
Act.pdf/Files/Personal% 20Insolvency%/2OAct.pdf.
195 See Commencement Orders, INSOLVENCY SERV. OF IR. (2013),
http://www.isi.gov.ie/en/ISI/Pages/Legislation; Julie Murphy-O'Connor et al.,
Commencement of reformed bankruptcy laws announced by Minister Shatter
(4 Dec. 2013), http://www.matheson.com/news-and-insights/article/
commencement -of-reformed-bankruptcy-laws-announced.
196 See, e.g., Free Legal Advice Centers, 21st century law needed for 21st
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personal insolvency regime has been thoroughly modernized
very much in line with the World Bank Report's three main
themes.
The changes to the discharge requirements represent a
real innovation, essentially introducing effective relief where
none had existed before. The much-maligned twelve-year waiting period and requirement that the court find it "reasonable
and proper" to grant a discharge have been relegated to the
past. Debtors are now entitled to an automatic, nondiscretionary discharge on the third anniversary of the date of
the order opening their bankruptcy case. 197 Unlike the Colombian discharge, 198 however, relief under the new Irish law is
neither immediate nor necessarily cost-free. Irish debtors may
have to earn their discharge by making years of imposed payments to their creditors, as discussed below. 199
Also, the new Irish law implements and clearly favors a
new regime for negotiated arrangements among creditors and
debtors. The new Irish law prioritizes these out-of-court solutions, likely just as effectively if not as emphatically as the Colombian law. 20 0 While negotiation with creditors is not absolutely required as a prerequisite to seeking a discharge in
bankruptcy, debtors petitioning for bankruptcy relief must
swear that that they have "made reasonable efforts to reach an
appropriate arrangement with ...creditors" by negotiating one

of these out-of-court plans "to the extent that the circumstances
century over-indebtedness!,
http://www.flac.ie/campaigns/current/21st -century-law-needed-for-21stcentury-overindebtedness/ (collecting materials critical of many aspects of the
personal insolvency scheme as proposed and ultimately adopted); Charlie
Weston, Insolvency deals not open to poorer families, says study, IRISH
INDEPENDENT (26 Sept. 2013), http://www.independent.ie/business/
personal-finance/insolvency-deals-not -open-to-poorer-families-saysstudy29611510.html.
197 See PIA 2012 § 157 (amending Bankruptcy Act 1988 § 85(1)).
Of
course, administrators and creditors can object to the entry of a discharge if
the debtor has failed to cooperate or hidden assets, but this is the exception
rather than the norm now. See also PIA 2012 § 157 (adding a new section 85A
to Bankruptcy Act 1988).
198 See supra note 99 and accompanying text. Citation ok, cannot find
English version of the CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 82, art. 553
("Acuerdo de pago").
199 See infra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
200 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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of the debtor would permit him to enter into such an arrange20 1

ment."

An analysis of the details of the complex system of socalled Debt Settlement Arrangements 20 2 and Personal Insolvency Arrangements 20 3 is beyond the scope of this paper, 20 4 but
suffice it to say that these schemes represent negotiation plat2
forms very similar to the conciliation regime in Colombia, 05

especially in two essential respects. First, they build on an existing institutional framework supporting consumer debt negotiation-MABS 206 -just as the Colombian system leveraged the
existing conciliation centers. 20 7 Indeed, somewhat like the Ital201 See PIA 2012 § 145 (amending and supplementing Bankruptcy Act
1988 § 11(4)). A similar preference for out-of-court arrangements is expressed in the amended sections 14 and 15 of the Bankruptcy Act 1988,
which now invites the court to adjourn any hearing on a creditor- or debtorinitiated bankruptcy petition if the debtor's situation might "be more appropriately dealt with by means of' one of the negotiated solutions. See PIA 2012
§§ 147, 148.
202 See PIA 2012 §§ 55-58.
203 See PIA 2012 §§ 89-125.
204 For lucid and detailed descriptions of the operations of these arrangements, including as applied to hypothetical debtors of various kinds, the
Insolvency Service has made several pamphlets available on its website. See
Guide to a Debt Settlement Arrangement, INSOLVENCY SERV. OF IR. (2013),
http://www.isi.gov.ie/en/ISI/DSA%/20final%/20pdf.pdf/Files/DSA%/20final

%20pdf.pdf; Guide to a Personal Insolvency Arrangement, INSOLVENCY

SERV.

OF IR. (2013), http://www.isi.gov.ie/en/I SI/PIA-Revised%/2016%/20August

%202013.pdf/Files/PIARevised%/o20160% 20August%/o202013.pdf; Debt Solutions

Scenarios Pack, INSOLVENCY

SERV. OF IR. (2014),http://www.isi.gov.ie/

en/ISI/ScenariosPackMarch2014.pdf/Files/ScenariosPackMarch2014.pdf.
205 See Proyecto, supra note 56, at 4-9; see MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR Y DE
JUSTICIA, CONCILIACION Y ARBITRAJE, supra note 63; see also Law 1380 of
2010, supra note 64; Email from Diana Lucia Talero, supra note 73 and
Email from Diana Lucia Talero; see Informe de Ponencia, supra note 76; see
WB Report, supra note 30: see WB Report, supra note 31; see KILBORN, supra
28, at 18; see also Statement on the Report on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons, supra note 34; see Block-Lieb, supra note 5 §1: see WB
Report, supra note 19; see also
WB Report, supra note 1, at 129; Law 3/2012, supra note 3; see London
Economics, supra note 104; see Joyce, supra note 144, at 29 and accompanying text.
207 Proyecto supra note 56, at 4-7; see also MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR Y DE
JUSTICIA, CONCILIACION YARBITRAJE, supra note 63 at 145-46, 175. On the national conciliation program, spearheaded by the Ministry of Justice and Law,
see http://www.conciliacion.gov.co/; see also CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra
note 82, art 533 (assigning responsibility for debt negotiation proceedings
first to the existing conciliation centers "expressly authorized by the Ministry
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ian approach of Crisis Composition Bodies, 20 8 but much more
developed, the Irish law creates an entire new industry of "Personal Insolvency Practitioners," enticing professionals like lawyers and accountants to represent individual debtors in negoti20 9
ating and administering these debt settlement schemes.
These PIPs are regulated by an entirely new public institution,
the Insolvency Service, set up to oversee the entire Irish personal insolvency regime and ensure its smooth and effective
operation. 2 10 This impressive new framework provides vital institutional support for the sensitive process of negotiating these
out-of-court arrangements, an essential ingredient for greater
211
success identified in the World Bank Report.
Second, though not as aggressive as either the Colombian 21 2 or Italian 21 3 laws, the new Irish law contains a mechaof Justice and Law to facilitate [advance] this type of proceedings, via conciliators registered in their lists" as well as to notary offices, who also have registered conciliators with the proper training required by regulation); Ministry
of Justice and Law, Decree no. 2677 of 21 December 2012, art. 13-15 (requiring specialized training for personal debt conciliators); Ministry of Justice
and Law, Resolution no. 21 of 15 June 2013 (outlining the minimum content
of training programs for conciliators). Both of these regulations are available, in Spanish only, online at http://www.conciliacion.gov.co/paginas
detalle, aspx?idp= 173.1]
208 See Cherubini at 36, 37 n. 4.; Cherubini, supra note 106 and accompanying text; Law 3/2012, supra note 103, art. 15 (establishing that these
bodies' qualifications and permissible fees will be regulated by the Ministry of
Justice in consultation with the Ministry of Economic Development and Ministry of Economy and Finance); Law 3/2012, supra note 103, arts. 7(1), 9, 11,
13, 15.
209 See PIA 2012 §§ 48-54, 64, 75, 98, 112, 159-86; VWhat is a personal insolvency practitioner?,INSOLVENCY SERV. OF IR., http://www.isi. gov. ie/
en/ISI/Pages/Practitioner (providing numerous links with further information).
210 See PIA 2012 §§ 7-24. (The Insolvency Service has a very useful website available at www.isi.gov.ie).
211 WB Report at 135, 137.
212 CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 82, art. 553(2).

The expected
duration of such plans is five years, though longer terms are allowed with the
assent of 60% of creditors or for claims with an original maturity period exceeding five years; Id. art. 553(10); Id. art. 558.
213 Law 3/2012, supra note 103, art. 11(1); Id. arts. 11(2), 12(3). Alternatively, a consumer debtor can submit a proposal for court approval without
soliciting creditor support, in which case the court may confirm such a plan
(binding on all creditors) so long as it is feasible and the debtor has not undertaken obligations without a reasonable prospect of being able to satisfy
them and has not engaged in borrowing disproportionate to his or her financial capacity; Id. arts. 12-bis, 12-ter. These subjective requirements seem
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nism for overcoming holdouts. Here again, agreement is not
required from 100% of a debtor's creditors; rather, both of the
new settlement arrangements can be imposed on dissenting
creditors with the support of a majority of creditors holding at
least 65% of the debts due to voting creditors. 2 14 The Insolvency
Service has already begun to take further steps to encourage
the establishment of the new statutory debt settlement agreements by developing a protocol, or template, for "standard" or
2 15

"straightforward" proposals.
Finally, Ireland joined Italy216 in rejecting the Colombian
unconditional discharge, 21 7 adopting an approach more in line
with the World Bank Report's third theme: The Irish bankruptcy law envisions at least some debtors being called on to
earn their fresh start by making payments from surplus income over a period of time. The Irish approach here raises similar concerns as under the Italian law, 218 though the Irish regime takes important steps to mitigate these concerns. The
Irish law takes the highly criticized approach 219 of vesting the
court with discretion in deciding whether, for how long, and
likely to be seldom established; see Panzani, supra note 109, at 17 (noting
that it is "a notion of common experience" that over-indebtedness arises from
consumers' excessive recourse to credit and their lack of adequate financial
education).
214 See PIA 2012 §§ 73,110 (additionally requiring approval by creditors
holding at least a majority of both unsecured and secured debts, separately
calculated, in Personal Insolvency Arrangements).
215
Protocol,
INSOLVENCY
SERV.
OF
IR.,
http://www.isi.gov.ie/en/ISI/Pages/Protocol Team (describing the creation of a
Debt Solutions Protocol Steering Group to formulate this template).
216 WB Report, supra note 1,
267-268, 274, 285-290, 292, 357; Relizone
179/2012, supra note 107, at 44; Law 3/2012, supra note 103, art. 14-ter 1(f),
2, 6(b), art. 14-quinquies 2(f), 9(2) (discussing in art. 14-ter 1(f), but so long as
courts interpret the law to keep this "part" within very modest bounds, one
would expect any debtor to be able to pay one or two ceremonial Euros to
creditors over the course of four years)(discussing in art. 14-quinquies 2(f),
containing an obviously erroneous reference to art. 14-ter (5)(b), intended to
refer to art. 14-ter (6)(b), as art. 14-ter (5) has no subsections).
217 CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 82, arts. 563-71 and accompanying text.
218 WB Report, supra note 1,
267, 285-290, 292; Law 3/2012, supra
note, art. 14-ter 2, 6(b), 6(d), 14-quinquies 9(2) (discussing 14-quinquies, containing an obviously erroneous reference to art. 14-ter (5)(b), intended to refer
to art. 14-ter (6)(b), as art. 14-ter (5) has no subsections).
219 WB Report, supra note 1,
267, 285-89, 290 and accompanying
text.
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how much payment to demand of debtors. 220 If the case or system administrator 22 1 makes an application for an order requiring the debtor to make payments to creditors from surplus income, the court "may" condition the discharge on the debtor's
compliance with a "bankruptcy payment order." 222 Only time
will tell how often such applications will be made, how often
courts will elect to impose such "bankruptcy payment orders,"
and what kinds of burdens they might impose on debtors in the
223
bankruptcy process.
The court's discretion, however, is not totally unfettered.
If the court chooses to impose a bankruptcy payment order, the
law at least prescribes or suggests limits for the length and calculation of such payments, consistent with the World Bank Report's caution against overly burdensome expectations. 224 The
duration of the payment obligation is capped at five years, thus
potentially extending beyond the automatic grant of discharge
relief three years after the bankruptcy case is opened. 225 This
again is in line with the Report's observations on "normal"
226
payment terms.
As for the amount of payment to be expected, the Irish law
again hews carefully to the preferred approach in the World
Bank Report, focusing on the reasonableness of the burden imposed on the debtor rather than the expected return to creditors. 22 7 While leaving the amount of required payments to the
discretion of the court, the law prescribes that courts "shall
220 See PIA 2012 § 157 (adding a new section 85D(1) to the Bankruptcy
Act 1988).
221 Creditors are apparently not allowed to make such applications. See
Id.
222 Id.
223 In the parallel system in England and Wales, courts enter so-called
"income payment orders" in only about one-fifth of bankruptcy cases. The Insolvency Service, Profiles of bankrupts: 2005/6 to 2007/8 § 2.9 (2009),
http://www.bis.gov.uk/insolvency/-/media/2410E1C3E434BB2BlOOO6E2019
F0046.ashx; A.J. NOORDAM ET AL., SCHULDSANERING (EX)ONDERNEMERS 333
(2013).
224 WB Report, supra note 1,
262-301, 312, 357-58 and accompanying
text.
225 See PIA 2012 § 157 (adding a new section 85D(3) to the Bankruptcy
Act 1988).
226 WB Report, supra note 1,
268 (noting a standard of 3 to 5 years,
with a convergence around 5 years).
227 WB Report, supra note 1,
49-50 and accompanying text.
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have regard for the reasonable living expenses of the bankrupt
and his or her dependants. 228 Further, the law suggests that
courts look for guidance to a uniform standard developed by
policymakers, proposing that the court "may" also have regard
to "any guidelines on reasonable living expenses issued by" the
229
new Insolvency Service.
The Insolvency Service has already developed such guidelines, and both the process of their development and the final
230
product are models of good practice. As required by the law,
the Insolvency Service consulted a wide variety of indicators
and experts on the subject of household income and expenses,
including very sensitive and detailed guidelines developed over
twelve years of extensive research by the Vincentian Partnership for Social Justice. 231 The Insolvency Service conducted a
"consensual budgeting" project using focus groups to identify
appropriate categories and amounts of expenditures for a minimum standard of living for various household types. 232 The
result is a budget that "is neither a survival standard nor a
standard for people in poverty; rather it is a standard of living
that should allow for people to engage in activities that are
considered the norm for Irish society." 233 These guidelines will
be updated at least annually to reflect changing costs of living. 234 They represent an extraordinary example of standards
for a modest but dignified lifestyle, perfectly consonant with
228 See PIA 2012 § 157 (adding a new section 85D(4) to the Bankruptcy
Act 1988).
229 Id.; see also id. § 23 (requiring the Insolvency Service to develop such
guidelines).
230
Id. § 23(2)-(3).
231 Insolvency Service, Guidelines on a reasonable standardof living and
reasonable
living
expenses
5-7,
16-20
(2013),
http://www.isi.gov.ie/en/ISI/Guidelines under section%2023 June 13.pdf/Fil
es/Guidelines under section %2023 June 13.pdf [hereinafter, ISI Guidelines].
232 Id.
at 21-30. This consensual budgeting process is one specifically
identified example of an effective process for creating a basic budget for
bankruptcy payment requirements. WB Report, supra note 1, 297.
233 ISI Guidelines, supra note 231, at 24.
234 Id. at 7; PIA 2012 § 23(6); Reasonable Living Expenses Guidelines,
INSOLVENCY SERV. OF IR. http://www.isi.gov.ie/en/ISI/Pages/
Reasonable living expenses, (announcing that "[it is the intention of the [Insolvency Service] to reissue these guidelines annually, reflecting the CPI adjustments").
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the third theme of the World Bank Report and the Council of
Europe's Recommendation for protecting the human rights of
235
insolvent debtors.
IV. CONCLUSION
While all three of these newest systems confirm the
tendencies identified in the World Bank Report, they also confirm another key observation: Reasonable minds can and will
differ on the best policies and the best ways of implementing
those policies in this area. 2 36 World lawmakers will continue to
differ in how they extend relief to over indebted individuals,
and that diversity is generally healthy. The Report expressly
disavows any desire to "mainstream" world legislation or to
impose a one-size-fits-all approach in all regions. 237 But it is
satisfying to see that the Report has had both direct and indirect influence in sensitizing policymakers to the benefits of offering this kind of relief to individuals, and that many of the
now-obvious missteps of the past are being more or less deftly
avoided by current lawmakers. As more countries follow Colombia, Italy, and Ireland down the difficult path toward adopting legislative relief for personal insolvency, I hope the lessons
of the Report spread around the globe and help millions more
debtors to escape from hopeless over indebtedness, in turn
helping their countries to enjoy maximal productivity and
healthy levels of social inclusion. We, legal academics, seldom
get a chance to see our work having a direct, positive influence
on the lives of others. I have seen that here, and the World
Bank project has been extraordinarily satisfying in that regard.

235
236
237

See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
WB Report, supra note 1, at
12, 29, 53-54.
WB Report, supra note 1, at
53-54.

